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Documents authored by Cholvy, Laurence


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A modal logic for reasoning on consistency and completeness of regulations

Authors: Christophe Garion, Stéphanie Roussel, and Laurence Cholvy

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 9121, Normative Multi-Agent Systems (2009)


Abstract
In this paper, we deal with regulations that may exist in multi-agent systems in order to regulate agent behaviour and we discuss two properties of regulations, that is consistency and completeness. After defining what consistency and completeness mean, we propose a way to consistently complete incomplete regulations. In this contribution, we extend previous works and we consider that regulations are expressed in a first order modal deontic logic.

Cite as

Christophe Garion, Stéphanie Roussel, and Laurence Cholvy. A modal logic for reasoning on consistency and completeness of regulations. In Normative Multi-Agent Systems. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 9121, pp. 1-17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2009)


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@InProceedings{garion_et_al:DagSemProc.09121.7,
  author =	{Garion, Christophe and Roussel, St\'{e}phanie and Cholvy, Laurence},
  title =	{{A modal logic for reasoning on consistency and completeness of regulations}},
  booktitle =	{Normative Multi-Agent Systems},
  pages =	{1--17},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2009},
  volume =	{9121},
  editor =	{Guido Boella and Pablo Noriega and Gabriella Pigozzi and Harko Verhagen},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.09121.7},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-19047},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.09121.7},
  annote =	{Keywords: Regulations, consistency, completeness, deontic logic, default logic}
}
Document
Deriving individual obligations from collective obligations

Authors: Christophe Garion and Laurence Cholvy

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7122, Normative Multi-agent Systems (2007)


Abstract
A collective obligation is an obligation directed to a group of agents so that the group, as a whole, is obliged to achieve a given task. The problem investigated here is the impact of collective obligations to individual obligations, i.e. obligations directed to single agents of the group. The groups we consider do not have any particular hierarchical structure nor have an institutionalized representative agent. In this case, we claim that the derivation of individual obligations from collective obligations depends on several parameters among which the ability of the agents (i.e. what they can do) and their own personal commitments (i.e. what they are determined to do). As for checking if these obligations are fulfilled or not, we need to know what are the actual actions performed by the agents. This present paper addresses these questions in the rather general case when the collective obligations are conditional ones.

Cite as

Christophe Garion and Laurence Cholvy. Deriving individual obligations from collective obligations. In Normative Multi-agent Systems. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7122, pp. 1-16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)


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@InProceedings{garion_et_al:DagSemProc.07122.11,
  author =	{Garion, Christophe and Cholvy, Laurence},
  title =	{{Deriving individual obligations from collective obligations}},
  booktitle =	{Normative Multi-agent Systems},
  pages =	{1--16},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7122},
  editor =	{Guido Boella and Leon van der Torre and Harko Verhagen},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07122.11},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-9118},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07122.11},
  annote =	{Keywords: Deontic logic, action, representation of preferences}
}
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